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SUPERFUND CLEANUPS, ETHICS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
Donald A. Brown* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly twenty years ago, former President Nixon signed the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, this nation's first major federal 
environmental law. Like the universe according to the "big-bang" 
theory, environmental law has been expanding in all directions since 
that time. Although the nation has now witnessed almost twenty 
years of continuing debate about environmental law, a relatively new 
element has recently entered the controversy, the use of risk as-
sessment procedures to determine levels of acceptable risk from the 
threats of hazardous wastes. 
Risk assessment procedures are the methods and techniques that 
are being used by government, and sometimes industry, to deter-
mine the magnitude and probability of the risks posed by hazardous 
chemicals or other environmental threats. In addition, these proce-
dures include the processes for determining the acceptability of these 
risks. This Article will use the term risk assessment procedures to 
include the process that attempts to quantify the risk, generally 
referred to as risk assessment, and the procedures employed to 
protect against the threats posed by the risk, generally referred to 
as risk management procedures. Thus, environmental risk assess-
ment procedures, when they are used in the management of super-
fund cleanups or in other environmental decision-making processes, 
* Chief of Central Region Litigation, Department of Environmental Resources, 503 Exec-
utive House, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120. B.S., 1967, Drexel Institute of Technology; 
J.D., 1973, Seton Hall University Law School; M.A., 1976, New School for Social Research. 
This author has been an environmental lawyer with the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
since 1974. He is interested in the interface between philosophy and science, especially as it 
is related to public policy-making on environmental issues. 
181 
182 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:181 
specify how environmental hazards will be characterized as to the 
nature and magnitude of the harm posed by these hazards and the 
degree of safety that can be expected from the cleanup remedy 
selected. Although the Superfund statute establishes criteria that 
must be taken into consideration in selecting the remedy at a super-
fund site, risk assessment procedures determine the methods for 
quantifying the risks and probabilities of harm that exist before and 
after the remedy is selected and implemented. 1 
With increasing frequency, government agencies are using risk 
assessment procedures to set environmental standards and cleanup 
levels. 2 The need to determine acceptable levels of cleanup at super-
fund sites has had a particularly large impact on the growth of risk 
assessment as a decision-making tool. For example, the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 requires that a new 
agency of the federal government, the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR), prepare health assessments, includ-
ing risk assessments for all existing and new superfund sites.3 The 
Superfund program has increasingly relied on such risk assessment 
procedures to make difficult decisions on the nature of remedial 
action at sites where soils and groundwater are often contaminated 
with high amounts of organic and other hazardous pollutants. 4 
Environmental professionals consider risk assessment procedures 
a useful new tool because: (1) modern technology has developed 
instrumentation that can measure pollutants to the parts per billion 
and sometimes parts per trillion levels, and government agencies 
find that they can identify pollutants at lower levels than those that 
can be cleaned up considering technical and sometimes economic 
1 Section 121(b) of Superfund specifies certain criteria that the President must consider in 
selecting a cleanup remedy at a Superfund site. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (Supp. IV 1986). This 
section provides, inter alia, that the President shall select a remedy that must be "protective 
of human health and the environment ... and that utilizes permanent solutions and alternative 
treatment technologies or resource recovery technologies to the maximum extent practicable." 
42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1). Furthermore, section 121(d) of Superfund specifies certain minimum 
cleanup standards that must be applied in selecting the remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d). Indeed, 
the EPA uses risk assessment procedures in determining whether the remedy protects human 
health and the environment as required by section 121(b) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund). 
2 See Grad, The Tyranny of Numbers, 1 ENVTL. LAW & LITIGATION 1 (1986). Although 
risk assessment procedures have been used by governmental environmental agencies for the 
last decade, the use of these procedures has grown most recently because of the Superfund 
program. 
342 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (Supp. IV 1986). 
4 See Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, Supeifund Public Health Evaluation Manual (Oct. 1986). 
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limitations; and (2) in cleanup decisions, government must consider 
the toxicity of substances that can cause serious health and environ-
mental problems at very low levels. This ability to measure pollu-
tants at very low concentrations and the concern about the toxic 
effects of low levels of hazardous pollutants force government to ask, 
"How clean is clean?" Government must determine the acceptable 
level of residual pollutants left at a site after the cleanup is com-
pleted. Risk assessment helps answer these questions because it is 
a tool that attempts to identify the environmental or health risks 
posed by pollutants at various levels of cleanup. 
As the state-of-the-art in risk assessment procedures develops 
under the pressure to make decisions in the superfund program, risk 
assessment procedures are used increasingly to make other regula-
tory decisions such as standard setting in air or water pollution 
programs. 5 Government environmental agencies have clearly en-
tered the age of the risk assessment. 
Before this ascendancy of risk assessment as a decision-making 
tool, when a spill of a pollutant occurred, a government agency often 
simply told a responsible party to remove the pollutant. 6 Inspections 
after cleanup often relied on visual observations to determine com-
pliance with a cleanup order. Most environmental professionals con-
sider risk assessment an improvement over what was done in the 
past because it provides a factual and scientific basis for the cleanup 
decision rather than an intuitive or emotional basis. Accordingly, 
many environmental professionals regard risk assessment proce-
dures to be neutral policy tools that can be employed by the govern-
ment to make sound technical judgments that assure efficient and 
appropriate cleanups. 
Are important ethical or values questions hidden or distorted in 
the technical discourse that is necessarily the language in which 
regulators discuss the risks associated with our hazardous waste 
5 See Grad, supra note 2, at 2. Although risk assessment procedures have been used in 
some environmental programs at the federal level for decades, use of these procedures has 
increased in the last few years at the state level and in some federal environmental programs. 
6 For example, this author was a staff attorney with the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection from 1973 through 1979. During that time, this author was aware 
of hundreds of spills per year that were reported to the New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection. Most of the spills reported during this time were petroleum products. This 
applicable water quality standard for oil was "no visible sheen." See 40 C.F.R. §§ 110.3 to 
110.6 (1987). Compliance with the standard was therefore assumed when there was no visible 
evidence of oil. Only since the 1980s have state environmental agencies begun to think in a 
sophisticated way about appropriate cleanup levels of hazardous wastes from contaminated 
soils and groundwater. 
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problems? Is human communication somehow impoverished through 
the use of technology-laden language in conversations about envi-
ronmental problems? This Article examines these questions and the 
ethical questions often embedded in risk assessment. 
This Article first examines risk assessment methodology, and then 
explores the difference between scientific and ethical questions found 
in risk management procedures. Next, the Article compares risk 
assessment with risk management procedures, and then describes 
how ethical questions can be distorted in risk assessment procedures. 
Finally, the Article assesses the implications to sound public policy 
of these values distortions in risk assessment procedures. 
II. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Risk assessment methodology has four major components: (1) haz-
ard identification, a determination of whether a substance will cause 
an adverse health effect; (2) dose-response assessment, an analysis 
of the relationship between an administered dose and the incidence 
of the adverse health effect; (3) exposure assessment, an analysis of 
the processes and pathways by which contact with a substance cre-
ates opportunity for exposure; and (4) risk characterization, the 
process of identifying the incidence of adverse health effects under 
various exposure pathways identified in the exposure assessment.7 
Each of these four major steps in developing a risk assessment relies 
on mUltiple analytical substeps. For example, in a report entitled 
"Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Pro-
cess," the National Academy of Sciences identified fifty steps in risk 
assessment of chemical carcinogenicity. 8 
III. SCIENCE AND ETHICS DISTINGUISHED 
Before an analysis of the ethical questions that are embedded in 
risk assessment is possible, it is important to distinguish between 
7 The United States Environmental Protection Agency published five sets of guidelines on 
risk assessment methodology on September 24, 1986. These are: Guidelines for Carcinogen 
Risk Assessment; Guidelines for Estimating Exposures; Guidelines for Mutagenicity Risk 
Assessment; Guidelines for Health Assessment of Suspected Developmental Toxicants; and 
Guidelines for the Health Risk Assessment of Chemical Mixtures. 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992-34,040 
(1986). These guidelines include a discussion of the major steps in risk assessment. [d. at 
33,993. 
8 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT 
(1983) [hereinafter RISK ASSESSMENT]. 
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scientific and ethical questions. 9 For purposes of definition, ethics 
means the domain of inquiry that attempts to answer the question, 
"What is good?" Ethical statements are propositions that such and 
such is good or bad, right or wrong, obligatory or nonobligatory. lO 
Ethics should be distinguished from the social sciences, such as 
sociology and psychology, which attempt to determine why individ-
uals or groups make statements about what is right, good, or obli-
gatory. Furthermore, ethics is concerned with "prescriptive" state-
ments that attempt to transcend relative cultural and individual 
positions. In contrast, science is the discipline that attempts to make 
"descriptive" statements about the nature of reality through analysis 
of facts and experience. Science and its derivative technologies at-
tempt to describe objectively, through an empirical methodology, 
facts and relationships between facts, and the laws of nature that 
govern the universe. 
It is generally accepted that science cannot deduce prescriptive 
statements from facts. ll That is, one cannot deduce "ought" from 
"is" without supplying a new minor premise. Thus, one cannot in-
troduce an evaluative term, such as "optimal solution," into the 
conclusion of an argument if the prior premises of the argument 
were entirely nonevaluative (for example, dose-response statistics). 
Although the description of certain facts may suggest an ethical 
position, one cannot deduce an ethical solution from a description of 
the facts alone. 
While facts alone are insufficient, an ethical system such as utili-
tarianism may provide the minor premise needed for ethical reason-
ing. For instance, if one concluded that option "A" will create the 
9 For a discussion of the differences between technical and ethical questions in environmental 
affairs, see I. BARBOUR, TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT, & HUMAN VALUES (1980). In addition, 
for a good general discussion of ethics, science, and environmental policy, see R. TONG, ETHICS 
IN POLICY ANALYSIS (1986); K. SHREDER-FRECHETTE, SCIENCE POLICY, ETHICS, AND Eco-
NOMIC METHODOLOGY (1985); K. SHREDER-FRECHETTE, RISK ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD (1985). 
10 See Brown, Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation, 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 331 
(1987). 
11 See, e.g.,Callicot, Hume's Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold's 
Land Ethic, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 162 (1982). The relationship between facts and ethical positions 
is of considerable controversy within the philosophical community. Although certain linguistic 
philosophers have held that moral reasoning made by individuals does not rely on deductive 
models in which ethical conclusions follow from ethical principles, I believe that it is particu-
larly important in developing public policy that those who are making ethical assertions be 
required to expose ethical premises that support ethical conclusions. See Marrietta, Knowledge 
and Obligation in Environmental Ethics: A Phenomenological Approach, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 
153 (1982). 
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greatest happiness by applying the utilitarian maxim that one should 
choose that option that creates the greatest happiness, one can 
conclude that option "A" is the optimal solution. From a proposition 
that a particular problem creates a particular risk, however, one 
cannot deduce what risk is acceptable without first deciding the 
criteria for acceptability. Therefore, on this largely traditional view 
of the logic of ethics, science cannot answer ethical questions all by 
itself. 
That is not to say, however, that science is irrelevant to ethics. 
Ethics is concerned with the ends that should be chosen by people. 
Science plays an extremely important role in most environmental 
ethical discussions because, once a particular goal is chosen, science 
can evaluate various means available to achieve that goal. Science 
can also analyze which goals are feasible and sometimes what the 
consequences of various alternatives are. If a society determines 
that it is good to build a nuclear power plant, for instance, science 
can analyze what structures or what types of institutions will most 
effectively and safely achieve the type of power plant that is desired 
by the community. Science can also help analyze what environmental 
impacts can be expected from the power plant. 
Science is thus obviously fundamental to the description of envi-
ronmental problems discussed in this Article and can be particularly 
important in identifying the health risks that certain projects pose. 
Those who are interested in a full and clear discussion of values 
questions posed by environmental problems, therefore, are not anti-
scientific. In fact, sound scientific analysis is essential in any attempt 
to define fully most ethical questions considered here. 
Despite the importance of science to ethical discussions, however, 
science cannot fully determine whether the power plant should be 
built, precisely because no amount of descriptive analysis can logi-
cally compel a prescriptive course of action. If we agree that the 
question of whether society should build a nuclear power plant is 
essentially an ethical question, while admitting that science is ex-
tremely important in analyzing the facts, and thereby giving content 
to the ethical question, it must be admitted that there is no generally 
accepted consensus in the philosophical community about which eth-
ical system or approach to apply to any given problem. For instance, 
several major ethical approaches attempt to define good, including 
utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, natural rights, and Rawlsian contract 
theory, just to name a few. Moreover, some philosophers believe 
that ethical assertions should be treated as nothing more than the 
emotive preferences of the person making the assertion on the 
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grounds that ethical assertions are entirely subjective and relative 
to the person making the values judgment. 
In addition, it is sometimes difficult to determine which facts 
should be considered and what weight they should be given in any 
ethical calculus. Because most of the dominant Western philosophical 
systems make human interests the measure of value, human inter-
ests, some critics argue, are the only interests considered in Western 
ethical systems. 12 As a result, such concerns as the rights of animals 
are not appropriately considered in traditional ethical debate. In 
response to the perceived inadequacy of traditional ethical ap-
proaches to environmental problems, and as concern about environ-
mental problems has increased over the last ten years, environmen-
tal philosophers have attempted to create new ethical approaches to 
these complex ethical problems. Because the number of approaches 
has multiplied, establishing that there are ethical questions that have 
not been adequately considered in public policy formulation is far 
easier than finding ethical solutions. This Article identifies how risk 
assessment procedures may distort ethical discourse about environ-
mental problems. 
Before one can analyze the ethical questions embedded in risk 
assessment, one must first be capable of identifying those aspects of 
risk assessment procedures that raise ethical and/or scientific ques-
tions. Most of the current debate about risk assessment appears to 
be scientific rather than ethical. 13 The number of scientific questions 
raised in risk assessment are numerous because of the considerable 
uncertainty that exists about most of the steps in a risk assessment. 14 
Scientific uncertainty exists in risk assessment because: (1) epide-
miological data relating to dose rates to human disease does not exist 
for most problems; (2) extrapolating dose-response results from an-
imals to humans requires the selection of untested assumptions; (3) 
effects of exposure may take years or generations to materialize for 
chronic diseases; (4) human experimentation is excluded on ethical 
grounds; (5) experiments must assume some dose rates, thereby 
giving no information about other dose rates; and (6) exposure as-
sessments must rely upon complex models that attempt to describe 
how pollutants may be transported through air, water, and soil and 
12 See, e.g., Naess, A Defense of the Deep Ecology Movement, 6 ENVTL. ETHICS 265 (1984). 
13 At the annual conference for the Society of Risk Analysis held in Washington, D.C., on 
October 30 to November 2, 1988, approximately 155 papers were given on various aspects of 
risk assessment. Most of the papers dealt with technical issues associated with risk assessment. 
14 See, e.g., Lepse, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Carcinogens, 4 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 86 (1980). 
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thereby create exposure opportunities to humans and animals. Sci-
entific uncertainty is often found in many of these component steps 
of a risk assessment because, in many of these areas, either a sci-
entifically sound theoretical basis has not yet been developed, or 
empirical data is inconclusive. Because theory is weak or data is 
incomplete, risk analysis must rely upon making many assumptions 
for which there is no a priori scientific basis that compels the choice 
of that assumption. 
Furthermore, risk assessment must rely upon a large number of 
distinct scientific disciplines. Risk assessment quantification must be 
based on biostatistics, carcinogenesis, toxicology, pathology, epide-
miology, genetics, medicine, nutrition, biochemistry, and teratol-
ogy.15 Biostatistics is the most frequently used discipline because 
many of the component steps in risk assessment require giving 
relative weights to findings from different studies or tests. 16 In 
addition, a risk assessment performed for a superfund cleanup must 
often rely on geology, hydrogeology, hydrology, civil engineering, 
and mathematical modeling. Consequently, it is very difficult for any 
government agency to have at its disposal, at anyone time, all the 
expertise necessary to develop or review a risk assessment. 
If risk assessment is to be used as the basis of regulatory action, 
choices must be made among options. Because there is often no a 
priori scientific basis for making such choices, these choices must be 
understood as unproven assumptions. While acknowledging that un-
proven assumptions must be made in risk assessment, environmental 
professionals often act as if they can look exclusively to scientific 
theory for guidance in selecting among available assumptions. For 
example, if no toxicological data exists for a particular chemical, 
prudent scientific theory suggests that the risk assessor use the 
toxicological data associated with a chemical of similar structural or 
chemical properties for the needed toxicological numbers. In this 
way, the risk assessor can bracket his or her ethical or political views 
by looking to scientific theory to resolve the many uncertainties. 
Following such procedures allows the scientific facts about the nature 
of the risk to be determined in such a way that the risk assessment 
16 McCray, An Anatomy of Risk Assessment: Scientific and Extra-Scientific Components in 
the Assessment of Scientific Data on Cancer Risks, at 88 (working paper for the National 
Academy of Sciences Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to the 
Public Health). 
16 [d. at 89. Biostatistics must be called upon in thirteen of the thirty-six component steps 
of risk assessment identified by McCray. 
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is not distorted by biases, prejudices, or personal values of the 
individual assessor. 
And so risk assessment is understood among environmental 
professionals as a scientific exercise that must rely upon a scientific 
process that is not fully developed but that, in principle, given 
enough time, can be expected to obtain the same confidence that 
other predictive sciences have enjoyed. Because the problems with 
risk assessment are viewed as primarily scientific problems, envi-
ronmental professionals focus almost exclusively on issues of scien-
tific uncertainty when discussing aspects of the development of a 
risk analysis. 17 Environmental professionals view risk assessment 
problems primarily as technical problems. Because these risk as-
sessment problems are viewed in this way, if ethical questions arise 
in the development of a risk assessment, they are often hidden in 
the technical language of the scientist. 
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT COMPARED TO RISK ASSESSMENT 
Once a quantitative risk assessment is completed, the use of the 
assessment in the regulatory process requires a "risk management" 
decision. 18 Risk management is the process in which various regu-
latory options for dealing with a risk are analyzed and decisions are 
made on how to handle the danger threatened by the risk. If; for 
instance, a risk assessment determines that a particular chemical 
spill poses a risk of one in ten thousand of causing cancer, a risk 
management analysis may evaluate alternative ways of dealing with 
that risk, such as removing the spilled material or placing the site 
of the spill behind a protective fence and, in this way, protecting 
people from exposure to this risk. 
In risk management decisions, public policy or ethical choices must 
be made. 19 In making these risk management decisions, choices must 
be made about levels of protection, the level of toxic pollutant that 
will remain at the site, whether humans or animals will be protected, 
and the extent to which economics should be considered. In contrast, 
risk assessment is assumed to be a value-free, scientific, analytical 
17 See Brown, supra note 10, at 347. 
18 For a discussion of the risk assessment and risk management interface, see Diesler, The 
Risk Management-Risk Assessment Interface, 22 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 15 (1988). 
19Id. Much of the literature on risk management decisions does not classify management 
decisions as ethical questions. The literature simply provides that management or policy 
options must be chosen. Any ethical dimension of such a choice is not apparent from most of 
the risk management literature. 
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process that postpones values questions to the risk management 
decision process. As a scientific procedure, it is assumed that the 
personal values of the assessor can be virtually eliminated from the 
risk assessment quantification process. 
A. Risk Assessment Is Not Completely Value-free 
Are risk assessments really "value-free" scientific procedures? Are 
the values of the assessor necessarily part of the risk assessment? 
Analysis of the choices that must be made in risk analysis makes the 
answer clear. Because risk assessment depends on choices for which 
there is no a priori scientific method of deciding from among avail-
able assumptions, risk assessment ultimately depends largely, if not 
predominantly, on values positions rather than on science.2o Each of 
the four components of risk assessment methodology requires the 
application of some judgment that must ultimately rely on something 
less than scientifically proven principles. Many of the choices that 
must be made in completing a risk assessment must be viewed as 
pure values judgments.21 For example, in the hazard identification 
portion of an assessment, the decision on picking a confidence level 
to determine statistically whether there has been a positive deter-
mination of whether a substance is a hazard is a pure values judg-
ment. 22 Most of the component steps in risk assessment are classified 
mid-way between pure science and pure values. 23 In summary, val-
ues judgments, understood as decisions about the appropriate degree 
of conservatism about risk assessment assumptions, pervade risk 
assessment methodology. 
If values judgments, rather than analytical science, are necessarily 
part of the risk assessment process, to what extent are the political 
or world views of the analyst responsible for the analysis? Frances 
M. Lynn addressed this question in a study entitled "The Interplay 
of Science and Values in Assessing and Regulating Environmental 
Risks. "24 According to this report, 
20 McCray, supra note 15, at 92. Of the thirty-six components of risk assessment identified 
by McCray, none are purely scientific. All these components therefore require the application 
of some value judgment according to McCray. That is, none of the components are merely the 
mathematical application of data to scientifically settled rules. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 90-93. 
23 Id. 
24 Lynn, The Interplay of Science and Values in Assessing and Regulating Environmental 
Risks, 2 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 40 (Spring 1986). 
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[even] after controlling for the influence of such standard demo-
graphic variables as age, sex, region, religion, and family back-
ground, scientists employed by industry tended to be politically 
and socially more conservative than government and university 
scientists. They chose scientific assumptions that decreased the 
likelihood that a substance would be deemed a risk to human 
health and increased the likelihood that a higher level of exposure 
would be accepted as safe. Government scientists were the most 
liberal politically and most protective in choosing among scientific 
assumptions. University scientists fell in between their govern-
mental and industrial colleagues.25 
191 
Similarly, a study prepared by the National Academy of Sciences 
reported that, where a scientist or risk assessor must make choices 
among several scientifically plausible options, policy considerations 
inevitably affected some of the choices. 26 These conclusions suggest 
that extra-scientific factors such as the cost of cleanup may influence 
the quantification of risk. 27 
Because the mere selection of the dose-response curve from sev-
eral available options can change the level of the risk by orders of 
magnitude, the potential prejudice of non-scientific influences is 
great in risk assessment. For instance, 
[o]ne model predicts the lifetime health risks from consuming 
drinking water containing fifty micrograms per liter of trichlo-
roethylene (TeE) to be approximately one percent while another 
predicts the risk to be less than 0.00000001%. As the authors of 
the article reporting these estimates note: "[t]hese estimates 
provide a range of uncertainty equivalent to not knowing 
whether one has enough money to buy a cup of coffee or payoff 
the national debt."28 
The many values assumptions embedded within risk assessment 
methodology thus make the apparent precision that is implied by 
quantification highly questionable. 
It is often difficult, however, to determine from risk assessments 
that values considerations have affected quantification. Some scien-
tists are very reluctant to identify the role that values have played 
in quantitative risk assessment because scientific processes are ide-
ally value-free exercises. Some scientists tend to hide controversial 
25 ld. at 41. 
26 RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 33. 
27 Lynn, supra note 24, at 45. 
28 Krages, Rats in the Courtroom: The Admissibility of Animal Studies in Toxic Tort 
Cases, 2 ENVTL. LAW & LITIGATION 229, 243 (1987) (citing Cothern, Conigilio & Marcus, 
Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 ENVTL: SCI. & TECH. 111, 115 (1986). 
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values decisions behind the guise of scientific objectivity because 
scientists are not accustomed to admitting that values considerations 
have affected their objective pursuits.29 In addition, scientific dis-
course does not easily accommodate values discussions. 30 
Failure to address and identify values considerations in risk as-
sessment particularly affects environmental risk assessment. For 
instance, given that the cost of a cleanup is a factor that continually 
exerts pressure on a scientist to reexamine his or her assessment of 
the risk, the failure to identify such trans-scientific considerations 
as cost in the quantification of the risk may hide the fact that the 
conclusions of a risk assessment may have affected the choice of 
assumptions. 31 Equally disturbing is the propensity of some scien-
tists, in the face of uncertainty, to focus all discussion on the quan-
titative issues while ignoring or denying political considerations such 
as the amount of money that is available in the superfund for 
cleanup.32 Such an approach prevents those who are interested in 
creating rational public policy from achieving their objective. 
B. Risk Management Decisions Require Consideration of Issues 
That Transcend Typical Management Problems 
Similar to the fact that risk assessment cannot escape the need to 
take values questions into consideration, risk management decisions 
in superfund cleanup cases require consideration of issues that tran-
scend typical management problems. This section explores some of 
the ethical questions that arise in the risk management phase of risk 
assessment procedures. 
Although many environmental professionals understand that it is 
in the risk management -component of the risk assessment proce-
dures that some public policy choices must be made, some risk 
managers are not trained to identify some of the ethical questions 
that may arise at this stage. 33 The kinds of decisions that must be 
made in the risk management stage of hazardous waste or superfund 
cleanup raise many difficult ethical questions that are rarely recog-
nized as ethical questions. Such decisions include determining the 
29 Brown, supra note 10, 346-47. 
30 Id. 
31 For a discussion of how conclusions of risk assessment may affect a person's choice of 
assumptions, see generally Rushefsky, Assuming the Conclusions: Risk Assessment in the 
Development of Cancer Policy, 4 POL. & LIFE SCI. 31 (1985). 
32 Brown, supra note 10, at 346-47. 
33 Id. 
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level of protection that the cleanup is attempting to achieve and 
whether water supplies are going to contain chemicals that pose a 
risk of causing cancer of one in one thousand or one in a million. A 
risk manager must decide whether cleanups should protect humans 
or animals, and, if animals are to be protected, what species should 
be protected. A risk manager may also have to decide whether to 
protect groundwater for current users or to protect all future poten-
tial users of the water by insisting that all the groundwater beneath 
a site meet the appropriate standards. Or a manager may have to 
choose between protecting people from contaminated soil by leaving 
some contaminated soil behind a fence or requiring that all the 
contaminated soil be completely removed to another location. Ad-
ditionally, a manager may have to determine the cost to be expended 
in cleanup when the risk to health is quantifiable but small. These 
kinds of questions cannot be answered by science alone because they 
are essentially ethical or political. They are prescriptive, not descrip-
tive, in nature. As a result, a scientific management technique cannot 
logically prescribe which choices should be selected if that manage-
ment technique refrains from taking a position on these ethical ques-
tions. 
Economists and others have attempted to develop a variety of 
analytical techniques, including cost-benefit analysis, that some 
professionals assert transform these ethical questions into value-
free, neutral, technical questions. 34 But most philosophers believe 
such an approach is equivalent to squaring a circle because each 
analytical technique takes an unarticulated ethical position that ex-
cludes other viable ethical approaches. For example, cost-benefit 
analysis assumes something similar to utilitarianism as its ethical 
position. 35 Thus, employing a cost-benefit analysis when making a 
risk management decision is tantamount to taking a position on an 
ethical question. 
Many philosophers view cost-benefit analysis approaches to public 
policy decision-making to be inappropriate because utilitarianism 
rests on the dubious ethical position that moral rights can be bal-
anced with expected utilities. Many philosophers believe that utili-
tarian approaches must be tempered by rights theories or other 
principles of justice. Nevertheless, the fact that an ethical approach 
34 For a discussion of why cost-benefit analysis and other economic analytical techniques 
cannot transform environmental problems into technical problems that avoid ethical questions, 
see M. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988). 
35 ld. at 104-11. 
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has been implicitly taken is usually not understood by the analyst, 
or is hidden in the jargon of the analysis, when cost-benefit analysis 
becomes the basis for a risk management decision. 
Other ethical problems may also be hidden in risk management 
decisions. 36 Most importantly, risk assessment involves so much sci-
entific uncertainty that comparisons of risks may be no better than 
untutored speculation. Because of this uncertainty, risk assessment 
cannot be relied upon to make the fine distinctions that it is some-
times required to do as part of a public policy decision. 
Ethical questions also arise if a particular hazard is not equally 
distributed among subgroups in a population. For instance, migrant 
farmers may be exposed to pesticides picking oranges in concentra-
tions thousands of times higher than the concentrations to which city 
dwellers are exposed. Considerations of due process or other rights 
theories may require that the migrant worker be protected from the 
pesticide to the same degree that the average consumer of oranges 
is protected. 
Ethical problems may also be hidden if the risk management de-
cision-making process fails to consider the type of harm that will be 
created by the risk. Risks that are grave and dangerous differ from 
risks that involve less dire consequences. Risks that create harms 
that are reversible may be less objectionable than those risks that 
create irreversible harm. If certain activities create a risk of death, 
even though that risk may be small, that risk may be more objec-
tionable on certain ethical grounds than a risk associated with sick-
ness that has a higher numerical probability of occurring. 
Ethical problems may also be hidden in risk management decision-
making processes that fail to distinguish risks created by new tech-
nologies or activities from those risks that people are exposed to 
daily but cannot control. That is, questions of risk sometimes confuse 
the ethical with normal uncontrollable risks. For instance, we often 
hear comparisons of risks with natural background conditions such 
as lightning or earthquakes. Although we have no choice but to 
accept the natural risks, new risks may be objectionable on ethical 
grounds. If one person in 100,000 dies because of background radia-
tion from the atmosphere, it does not necessarily follow that it is 
ethically appropriate to choose to expose people to new levels of 
radiation that are likely to produce the same rate of death. Risk 
management decisions that allow exposure to pollutants because 
36 See Brown, supra note 10, at 338. 
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they compare favorably with risks that are natural, therefore, hide 
ethical considerations. 
Similarly, risk management decisions that simply declare that 
cleanup procedures at a superfund site will leave pollutants at a level 
that pose an acceptable risk may hide important ethical questions. 
The term "acceptable risk" includes a normative dimension that is 
usually not defended in the public policy debate. Thus, a government 
sometimes declares that a cleanup standard will adequately protect 
public health without exposing the ethical criteria on which this 
adequacy rests. For example, small risks to a small proportion of 
the human population are often asserted to be "acceptable." 
When a large number of humans are involved, however, there can 
be a large number of statistical casualties. These casualties are 
tolerated because the quantitative risk seems small. If the govern-
ment is willing to accept a risk that one in 100,000 will get cancer 
from exposure to a substance that all people in the United States 
may be exposed to, the government is willing to tolerate 2,500 
cancers. Despite the low risk statistically, the number of actual 
cancers caused may make such a risk unacceptable according to a 
variety of ethical theories. Ethical considerations may thus require 
that the risk be avoided or minimized. 
Risk management decisions may mask certain considerations when 
a risk manager, under the pressure of scientific uncertainty, bases a 
risk management decision on liberal assumptions because he or she 
could not prove that more conservative assumptions represent the 
actual risk. Who has the burden of proof to show that a new tech-
nology or substance is safe or that the risk is acceptable is an 
important ethical consideration. This consideration is important be-
cause ethics distinguishes between risks that one chooses to accept 
from those that one is exposed to without permission. 
Because risk assessment often attempts to predict consequences 
in situations of fundamental uncertainty, where harm may be created 
because of the introduction of a new substance or technology, the 
proponent of the new substance or technology may shoulder the 
burden of proof of showing that the risk assessment is reliable ac-
cording to certain ethical theories. Therefore, where uncertainty is 
great as to the nature of the harm, ethical considerations may de-
mand that the proponent of a new chemical be prohibited from 
manufacturing that chemical until the proponent demonstrates that 
it is safe. The mere statement of a quantified but uncertain risk 
associated with that chemical may otherwise distort these ethical 
considerations where the uncertainty has been resolved in favor of 
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the person who is responsible for exposure to the pollutant because 
the government assumed a burden of proof it could never satisfy. 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO IDENTIFY ETHICAL 
QUESTIONS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
Although it is admittedly important to continue to enhance our 
analytical ability to make mathematical estimates of risk, it is also 
critically important to develop the ability and procedures to identify 
the many values questions that are often central to making a risk 
management decision but that are sometimes hidden in the risk 
assessment jargon. Failure to identify the ethical positions that are 
necessarily embedded in most risk assessment procedures leads to 
the following problems: 
(1) Failure of democratic institutions. If risk assessment decisions 
about toxic waste often rely primarily on ethical choices rather than 
scientific calculation, the failure to disclose these ethical choices 
constitutes a failure of our democratic institutions. In a democracy, 
such judgments are supposed to be made by the people or their 
elected representatives, not by experts who hide ethical choices in 
technical jargon. If risk assessment quantifications ultimately rely 
upon the choices of individuals, the dominant ideology of those "ex-
pert" individuals may determine the level of protection that citizens 
receive. 
This failure to identify ethical positions allows any person who 
wants to impose his or her ideology on government environmental 
protection activities to do so by controlling the way in which "tech-
nical" decisions are made. Furthermore, in superfund cases risk 
assessments are often prepared by technical experts hired by the 
party responsible for cleanup, and government does not have at its 
disposal at anyone time all of the different expert disciplines that 
are necessary to critique such a risk assessment and thereby expose 
the values premises embedded therein. As a result, the values as-
sumptions of the person responsible for causing the environmental 
hazard often determine how the risk associated with the environ-
mental problem is quantified. 
(2) Inability to analyze risk management decisions. If important 
policy questions are hidden in what appears to be rational, but 
neutral, technical calculations, communication about hazardous 
waste is distorted. If the ethical choices that have been made in the 
risk assessment and risk management decisions have not been dis-
closed, those who are interested in adequate public protection from 
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environmental hazards, as well as those who are concerned about 
the level of costs that they must assume to implement a cleanup, 
cannot critique the risk assessment. For example, people who live 
near a hazardous waste site will be misled by statements that a 
cleanup is "adequate" if cleanup "adequacy" actually rests on a quan-
titative process that is structured by pervasive uncertainty or du-
bious ethical thinking. 
(3) The propensity of cost to influence risk assessment and risk 
management procedures. Because the costs of a cleanup can be 
calculated with more precision than the environmental risk, some 
environmental professionals tend to change assumptions that have 
been made in a risk assessment to accommodate these cost consid-
erations. If cost is taken into account in risk assessment procedures, 
that fact should be disclosed. When a risk management decision 
allows a responsible party to clean up a site by allowing some pol-
lutants to remain in the soil because cost considerations would not 
allow complete cleanup, that fact should be disclosed. Thus, if PCBs 
of fifty parts per million (ppm) will be left in soil at a superfund site 
because the cost of removing to one ppm is considered prohibitive, 
professionals should disclose that the resulting cancer risk quantifi-
cation estimates the cancer risk of fifty ppm PCB to be 1.0 x 10-3 
and one ppm PCB to be 1.0 x 10-6 • 
Such disclosure is ethically preferable to changing the assumptions 
in the risk assessment so that fifty ppm PCB risk quantification 
becomes 1.0 x 10-6 • Because of the softness of scientific certainty, 
there is a propensity in risk assessment to make the risk quantifi-
cation "work out" to be consistent with the level of costs considered 
acceptable. The failure to acknowledge that the risk management 
process has taken cost into account constitutes systematically dis-
torted communication about values. 
(4) The propensity to clean up to "acceptable" levels only. Because 
scientific procedures are considered capable of defining levels of 
acceptable risk, there is a growing propensity to clean up only to 
those levels generated through the risk assessment despite the fact 
that, in some circumstances, complete removal of the hazardous 
chemicals may be feasible. Because risk-based levels may be consid-
erably higher than the naturally occurring background levels of those 
chemicals in groundwater or soils, the cleanup to "acceptable" health 
levels may tolerate considerable degradation of groundwater or soils 
compared to the levels found before the contamination. Thus, a risk-
based approach to cleanup may encourage toleration of degradation 
of the environment in situations where it is economically and tech-
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nologically feasible to restore contaminated areas or waters to nat-
ural background conditions. Because it is likely that views of the 
toxicity of hazardous wastes may change in the future, such an 
approach may be folly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, environmental decisions must be viewed primarily 
as ethical choices rather than as technically dictated conclusions. It 
is important in an age of increasing scientific complexity that inter-
ested parties attempt to understand the values positions and ethical 
issues that underlie scientifically derived policy choices. Experts and 
concerned citizens must realize that crucial policy choices concerning 
environmental pollution and toxic chemicals are values judgments, 
matters of morality, and social and political judgments. 
As long as the values component of environmental decision-making 
is relegated to technical experts, persons who are not necessarily 
experts in ethics or values studies, communication about risk as-
sessment procedures may be flawed by values distortions. Given 
that technicians sometimes are reluctant by training and disposition 
to deal with values questions, risk assessment procedures must be 
amended to assure that ethical issues are identified to avoid system-
atic distortion of values questions. Government must bring greater 
clarity to the debate about environmental cleanup through identifi-
cation of the embedded values positions and issues in risk assessment 
procedures. To accomplish this goal, risk assessment methodology 
must require that those performing risk assessment identify with 
clarity and precision: (1) the nature and magnitude of all uncertainty, 
(2) any assumptions embedded in risk assessment procedures that 
have been relied upon, (3) identification of any ethical issues consid-
ered in the analysis and the ethical approaches taken on these issues, 
and (4) the extent to which costs or other trans-scientific consider-
ations have affected the analysis. 
